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The Present Crisis in American Bail
Kellen Funk
abstract. More than ﬁfty years after a predicted coming federal courts crisis in bail, district
courts have begun granting major systemic injunctions against money bail systems. This Essay
surveys the constitutional theories and circuit splits that are forming through these litigations. The
major point of controversy is the level of federal court scrutiny triggered by allegedly unconstitutional bail regimes, an inquiry complicated by ambiguous Supreme Court precedents on (1) postconviction ﬁnes, (2) preventive detention at the federal level, and (3) the adequacy of probable
cause hearings. The Essay argues that the application of strict scrutiny makes the best sense of
these precedents while also taking account of the troubled history of American bail, particularly
during the Reconstruction Era from which the right to sue state officials in federal court for violations of constitutional rights emerged.

introduction
In 1965, the civil rights advocate Caleb Foote foretold a “coming constitutional crisis in bail.”1 Foote was an extraordinary law professor whose research
stemmed from the multiple prison terms he served for conscientiously objecting
to the draft.2 To Foote, an opponent of Japanese internment in the 1940s and of
wealth-based detention in the 1960s, the crisis in bail seemed clearly imminent.
Given the Supreme Court’s recent solicitude for defendants’ Fourth and Sixth
Amendment rights,3 Foote was sure that American bail regimes were about to

1.
2.

3.

Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (1965).
Douglas Martin, Caleb Foote, Law Professor and Paciﬁst Organizer, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3,
2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/03/us/03foote.html [https://perma.cc/9JQ9
-QCYW].
E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires
states to appoint attorneys to represent indigent defendants); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643

1098

the present crisis in american bail

face intense pressure in the federal courts. And if the states followed a “snail-like
pace of reform,” the federal courts would have no choice but to “force[] major
change down the throats of the states by way of the fourteenth amendment.”4
But the crisis as Foote foresaw it, one instigated and driven by the federal
courts, did not come. As the Warren Court gave way to the retrenchments of the
Burger era, strategic litigation in Florida spurred the Supreme Court to establish
new procedural rights to prompt probable cause hearings in Gerstein v. Pugh.5
But Pugh’s challenge against Miami’s money bail system never reached the
Court; instead, it resulted in a Delphic pronouncement by the en banc Fifth Circuit.6 The en banc majority approved of reliance on bail schedules but indicated
that in practice the reﬂexive use of schedules might fail heightened federal court
scrutiny.7 Five separate opinions then followed, disputing each point.8 The
Burger Court subsequently rejected an as-applied challenge to a money bail system in O’Shea v. Littleton,9 now considered a classic case of federal-court restraint.10 The only time the Supreme Court has addressed bail since was in
United States v. Salerno,11 in which the Court upheld the outright denial of bail
under the 1984 amendments to the Federal Bail Reform Act.12
That is not to say there has been no crisis in bail. As with mass incarceration
generally, pretrial incarceration exploded across the law-and-order decades of
the 1970s and 1980s.13 Estimates hold that today around sixty to seventy-ﬁve

(1961) (holding that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible
in state-court prosecutions).
4. Foote, supra note 1, at 959.
5.
420 U.S. 103 (1975).
6. Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1059 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (“[T]he new Florida rule is
not facially unconstitutional and we abstain from its further consideration.”).
7.
Id. at 1058.
8. Id. at 1059 (Simpson, J. dissenting); id. at 1068 (Clark, J., specially concurring); id. at 1069
(Coleman, J., specially concurring); id. at 1070 (Gee, J., specially concurring); id. at 1071 (Rubin, J., concurring).
9. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
10. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 227-35 (7th ed. 2015) (discussing the case at length).
11. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
12. Id. at 741; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50 (2018).
13. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 35
(Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014) (documenting an explosion in the rate of people incarcerated
in jails).
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percent of all individuals in jails are unconvicted defendants awaiting trial.14 Although it is difficult to measure with precision, undoubtedly a high proportion
of these individuals are detained solely because they cannot afford the moneybail amount set in their cases. Those amounts are commonly set by courts on a
slim evidentiary record in “hearings” lasting less than two minutes.15 Moneybail systems remain the norm in state courts across the country; they are far more
common than systems in which judges order a defendant’s release or detention
based on ﬂight risk and dangerousness, such as in the (comparatively small) federal criminal system.16 Thus, the vast majority of pretrial detainees in the United
States are conﬁned because they cannot afford to post a bail amount set according to a schedule or after a perfunctory hearing. This is a reality made starkly
apparent by the widely noted recent suicides of Kalief Browder and Sandra
Bland, both detained because of their inability to pay a relatively small moneybail amount.17 Pretrial incarceration on this scale has drained unfathomable
amounts of human and ﬁnancial capital from already marginalized poor communities and communities of color.18

14.

15.
16.

17.

18.

See TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NCJ 248629, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014, at 3 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub
/pdf/jim14.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8C7-WH9R] (estimating that sixty percent of jail inmates
are unconvicted). For the most up-to-date ﬁgures drawn from a variety of sources, see Peter
Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE
(Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html [https://perma.cc
/K8FG-L6CR] (reporting that seventy-ﬁve percent of people conﬁned in local jails have not
been convicted).
See Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case
Outcomes, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 514 & n.5 (2018).
See, e.g., Pretrial Justice in America: A Survey of County Pretrial Release Policies, Practices and
Outcomes, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. 2, 7 (2010), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic
/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=d4c7feb2-55be-ccd0-f06a-02802
f18eeee&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/P3P9-2UT2] (reporting that 64% of U.S. counties
use a secured money bail schedule to determine eligibility for release prior to a ﬁrst appearance
hearing, based on a survey of 112 of the 150 most populous counties in the nation). On the
federal system’s general aversion to monetary conditions of release, see Thomas H. Cohen,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Pretrial Release and Misconduct in Federal District Courts, 2008-2010,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. 1, 5 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prmfdc0810.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V5SF-G8LQ] (showing that of the 36% of federal defendants released pretrial, 27% were released on a monetary condition, and only 8% used a commercial surety to
satisfy that condition).
Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.newyorker
.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law [https://perma.cc/9LB2-Z9U7]; Margaret Talbot, Watching Sandra Bland, NEW YORKER (July 29, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com
/news/daily-comment/watching-sandra-bland [https://perma.cc/HD7M-97UM].
See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 47-62 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/opa/press-releases
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Now, ﬁve decades later, we may ﬁnally be witnessing the crisis in the federal
courts that Foote foretold. In April 2017, Chief Judge Rosenthal of the Southern
District of Texas enjoined the misdemeanor bail system of Harris County,
Texas—the third-largest jail system in the nation—from engaging in wealthbased detention.19 Injunctions echoing the opinion and order of the Harris
County litigation have since followed elsewhere in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.20 Cases pursuing similar theories are pending in district court in San Francisco and New Orleans.21 State courts, too, have interpreted the Federal Constitution to reach similar holdings.22
This Essay surveys the constitutional terrain of federal court bail litigation in
the aftermath of ODonnell v. Harris County. Now that local bail systems are under
increased federal court scrutiny, what are the key constitutional issues emerging,
and where might we expect the courts to go from here?23 Part I brieﬂy explains
three theories driving the challenges—equal protection, substantive due process,

19.
20.

21.

22.

23.

/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/X2QN-8DKB].
ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d as modiﬁed, 892 F.3d
147 (5th Cir. 2018).
Daves v. Dallas County, 341 F. Supp. 3d 688 (N.D. Tex. 2018), appeal pending, Daves v. Dallas
County, No. 18-11368 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 2018); Shultz v. Alabama, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1365
n.23 (N.D. Ala. 2018), appeal pending sub nom. Hester v. Gentry, No. 18-13898 (11th Cir. Sept.
13, 2018).
Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco, Civil No. 15-4959, 2018 WL 424362 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
28, 2015); Cain v. City of New Orleans, Civil No. 15-4479 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 2015). Recently
the Buffin court reaffirmed its holdings on the constitutional standard to be applied. See Buffin,
2019 WL 1017537, *13-16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019).
In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513 (Ct. App. 2018), appeal pending, 417 P.3d 769 (Cal. 2018);
State v. Brown, 338 P.3d 1276 (N.M. 2014); State v. Pratt, 166 A.3d 600 (Vt. 2017). The remainder of this Essay focuses on federal court litigation. For a recent discussion of state court
approaches to bail reform, see Dorothy Weldon, Note, More Appealing: Reforming Bail Review
in State Courts, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2401 (2018).
To make two things clear at the outset, this Essay is concerned with only the substantive requirements of the Bill of Rights and the Reconstruction Amendments. For these purposes, I
take for granted that a bail challenge has achieved federal court review on the merits by getting
through the myriad procedural and jurisdictional challenges these cases often confront. That
is no light assumption because standing, immunity, and abstention—just to name a few jurisdictional doctrines—present signiﬁcant barriers, see, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris County, 227 F.
Supp. 3d. 706 (S.D. Tex. 2016), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 892 F.3d 147 (ruling on the
County’s motion to dismiss), which would require a separate volume to resolve. Second, I use
“bail” in its colloquial sense of secured money bail—that is, a requirement for cash or collateral
upfront to be released from pretrial detention. Bail has not always had that meaning, and for
hundreds of years it involved no upfront transfers of money or collateral of any kind. See Timothy R. Schnacke et al., The History of Bail and Pretrial Release, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. (Sept. 23,
2010), https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ccjj/Committees/BailSub/Handouts/HistoryofBail-PreTrialRelease-PJI_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8QM-FYS9].
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and procedural due process—and one ground notable for its absence, the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Part II then focuses on two related
difficulties arising in these bail challenges: the puzzling requirements of federal
court scrutiny and the interaction between bail and probable cause standards of
review. What is often an abstract legal debate about “tiers of scrutiny” in constitutional law turns out to have dramatic consequences when bail systems are challenged in federal court. As a growing empirical literature demonstrates the catastrophic costs of pretrial detention on both defendants personally and on society
at large, the key question in bail litigation—and the possibility for crisis—turns
on the degree to which federal courts must take account of these alarming facts.
Consonant with the troubled history of bail in our constitutional tradition, arising during the Reconstruction Era at the origins of modern civil rights review in
the federal courts, this Essay argues that federal court scrutiny should be strict
indeed.
i. constitutional grounds for challenging municipal
money-bail systems
A. Equal Protection
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis of Harris County’s bail system vividly illustrates
why detention on money bail violates the Equal Protection Clause:
[T]ake two . . . arrestees who are identical in every way—same charge,
same criminal backgrounds, same circumstances, etc.—except that one is
wealthy and one is indigent . . . . One arrestee is able to post bond, and
the other is not. As a result, the wealthy arrestee is less likely to plead
guilty, more likely to receive a shorter sentence or be acquitted, and less
likely to bear the social costs of incarceration. The poor arrestee, by contrast, must bear the brunt of all of these, simply because he has less
money than his wealthy counterpart.24
“But wait,” a law student cries, “I know this one! Wealth-based discrimination
isn’t a suspect classiﬁcation and triggers only rational basis review, and federal
courts must defer to whatever rational basis the local government comes up
with.” No doubt that is the credited answer to many a Con Law 101 exam. But
often overlooked is the Supreme Court’s single exception in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the case establishing the general rule of rational basis for wealth-based discrimination: “an absolute deprivation” of liberty

24.

ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 163.
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occasioned by wealth (or indigence) triggers heightened scrutiny.25 The Court
created this exception to take account of a line of post-conviction ﬁnes cases, a
line that culminated (a decade after Rodriguez) in Bearden v. Georgia.26
Bearden involved the incarceration of a convicted defendant who had failed
to pay his ﬁne. The Court had previously held that “the Constitution prohibits
the State from imposing a ﬁne as a sentence and then automatically converting
it to a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent.”27 But what if the detention was not quite automatic? How much process and inquiry must a state
engage in before it can impose detention for failure to pay? The Bearden Court
ruled that only if alternative measures are “not adequate . . . to meet the State’s
interest[s] . . . may the State imprison a probationer who has made sufficient
bona ﬁde efforts to pay.”28 Recognizing the states’ broad penological interests,
the Court nevertheless required “a careful inquiry” into factors like “the existence
of alternative means” for meeting those interests.29 Only if a defendant engaged
in bad faith (i.e., he could pay the money but refused to do so) or if there were
no other option discovered in the course of this careful inquiry could the state
order detention for failure to pay the ﬁne.30
While the Supreme Court has not applied Bearden or its other postconviction
ﬁne cases to the pretrial context, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have.31 And at
least some courts are persuaded by the logic that Bearden’s rule applies “with
special force in the bail context, where . . . arrestees are presumed innocent.”32
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s ﬁrst modern bail opinion observed that unless the
right to pretrial liberty was carefully preserved, “the presumption of innocence,
secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.”33 As the Court
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

33.

411 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1973) (emphasis added). On the doctrinal path of wealth classiﬁcations under equal protection up to and through Rodriguez, see Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness,
128 YALE L.J. 2, 40-46 (2018).
461 U.S. 660 (1983); see also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235 (1970).
Tate, 401 U.S. at 398 (quoting and adopting the reasoning of Morris v. Schoonﬁeld, 399 U.S.
508, 509 (1970)).
461 U.S. at 672.
Id. at 666-67.
Id. at 668-69, 672.
Both circuits are bound by the former Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Pugh v. Rainwater,
572 F.2d 1053, 1056-57 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 15-CV-4959-YGR, 2018 WL 424362, at *9 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 16, 2018); accord In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 528 (Ct. App. 2018); cf.
ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 162 n.6 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he distinction between
post-conviction detention targeting indigents and pretrial detention targeting indigents is one
without a difference”).
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
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has elsewhere recognized, a detainee “is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense,”34 another set of interests that analytically seem to have greater weight pretrial than post-conviction. Nevertheless, some courts apparently think that applying Bearden pretrial
with “special force” simply means applying Bearden pretrial. The Conference of
Chief Justices took this position in a recent amicus brief to the Fifth Circuit. The
Conference argued that the Bearden right applies with greater force pretrial, but
its conclusion called for a straightforward application of the Bearden rule: “a ﬁnancial condition of release that operates to detain an indigent defendant must
be based on a ﬁnding that such condition is necessary to secure the state’s interest in ensuring appearance at trial or public safety.”35
The theory thus runs that equal protection forbids the detention of the indigent (set aside for a moment how that would be deﬁned)36 while the wealthy
can purchase their liberty, unless the state has carefully determined that no other
alternative could meet its interests. The state’s interests in the pretrial context
are ensuring defendants’ appearance at future court dates37 and, as the Supreme
Court has more recently held, protecting public safety.38 Below, I address
whether and how often there might conceivably be no feasible alternative to secured money bail.
B. Substantive Due Process
For centuries, courts recognized only one legitimate public purpose for setting bail: assuring the defendant’s return to court.39 Under pressure from the
rise of organized crime and law-and-order politics, Congress in 1984 amended
the federal bail statute to require judges to consider the safety of the public, of
alleged victims, and of potential witnesses in setting bail.40 In addition, Congress
expanded the federal courts’ power to deny bail outright and order “preventive
detention”: indeﬁnite incarceration pending trial, no matter how many months

34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972).
Brief of Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, ODonnell,
892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-20333), 2017 WL 3536467, at *24, *26-27.
As Andrew Hammond has recently shown, poverty determinations can be (though he argues
they need not be) quite complicated and require an array of data collection from those invoking poverty status. Andrew Hammond, Pleading Poverty in Federal Court, 128 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019).
Stack, 342 U.S. at 5.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
Schnacke, supra note 23, at 2, 5-9.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1984).
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or years trial took.41 Many state and local jurisdictions followed Congress’s
lead.42
The test case challenging the federal bail amendment—and the only Supreme Court decision on bail since the 1980s—was United States v. Salerno.43 “Fat
Tony” Salerno was probably the least sympathetic defendant to litigate constitutional standards for pretrial detention. The boss of a New York mob family notorious for extortion, illegal gambling, and murder, Salerno was reputed to order
hits by uttering a single word over the telephone.44 If broad segments of American society could agree that anyone ought to be detained pretrial without bail, it
was Fat Tony.
The Supreme Court upheld the federal bail act against Salerno’s facial challenge. The opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist provoked stern dissents from Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens,45 and criticism ﬂowed from progressive quarters at the time.46 Nevertheless, Salerno has more recently provided a powerful

41.

42.

43.
44.
45.
46.

Of course, speedy trial rights in theory set outer limits on how long trial may take. But both
at the state and federal levels, speedy trial rights have proven ineffective in practice. See Malcolm M. Feeley, How to Think About Criminal Court Reform, 98 B.U. L. REV. 673, 681 (2018);
Shon Hopwood, The Not So Speedy Trial Act, 89 WASH. L. REV. 709, 711 (2014); Daniel Hamburg, Note, A Broken Clock: Fixing New York’s Speedy Trial Statute, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 223 (2015); Editorial, Total Failure on Speedy Trials in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/opinion/total-failure-on-speedy-trials-in
-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/3AUJ-KB6Y].
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275(a)(1) (West 2018), repealed by California Money Bail Reform
Act, S.B. 10, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (“In setting, reducing, or denying bail, a judge
or magistrate shall take into consideration the protection of the public . . . . The public safety
shall be the primary consideration.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/110-5 (West 2018) (“In
determining the amount of monetary bail or conditions of release, if any, which will reasonably assure the appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the
community and the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of bail,
the court shall . . . take into account such matters as the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, [and] whether the evidence shows that as part of the offense there was a use
of violence or threatened use of violence . . . .”); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 316 (2019)
(“The amount of bail shall be ﬁxed . . . having regard to . . . [t]he nature and the seriousness
of the danger to any other person or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s
release.”).
481 U.S. 739 (1987).
Daniel Richman, United States v. Salerno: The Constitutionality of Regulatory Detention, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 413, 422-23 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 756 (1987) (Marshall, J. dissenting); id. at 768 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing
Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510 (1986); Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim,
Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 341 n.44 (1990).
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point of attack against money bail systems and the rampant incarceration they
have fueled.47
Salerno came right up to the precipice of engaging in a substantive due process analysis without explicitly invoking those terms. Conventionally, substantive due process doctrine recognizes that certain rights are so fundamental to the
history and traditions of the United States that the Constitution protects against
their deprivation unless rigorous requirements are ﬁrst satisﬁed.48 Under this
“strict scrutiny,” “the Fourteenth Amendment ‘forbids the government to infringe . . . “fundamental” liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.’”49 Although never invoking substantive due process or the strict-scrutiny standard by name, the Salerno Court acknowledged the “fundamental nature” of pretrial liberty and upheld the federal Bail Reform Act because the Court
found it “a carefully limited exception” to the “norm” of pretrial liberty.50
Like Bearden, Salerno suggests substantive limits that careful tailoring may
require of a detention order or detention regime. In upholding the preventivedetention provisions of the Federal Bail Reform Act, the Salerno Court noted that
the regime applied only to those charged with “a speciﬁc category of extremely
serious offenses,” whom Congress had “speciﬁcally found” to be especially dangerous.51 To impose detention, moreover, the Act required a court to ﬁnd, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant presented “an identiﬁed and
articulable threat to an individual or the community” and that “no conditions of
release [could] reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person.”52
The Salerno Court also found several of the Bail Reform Act’s procedures
highly relevant to its tailoring inquiry. Noting that the Act supplied detained
defendants with (1) a hearing, (2) representation by counsel, (3) the ability to
present evidence, (4) court ﬁndings on the record subject to a clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard, and (5) a right to an expeditious appeal, the Court
sustained the Act against Salerno’s challenge that it was facially unconstitutional

47.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See, e.g., In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 530-35 (Ct. App. 2018); Criminal Justice Committee Report & Recommendations: Pretrial Decision-Making Practices, TEX. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 2
(Oct. 2016), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1436204/criminal-justice-committee-pretrial
-recommendations-ﬁnal.pdf [https://perma.cc/4W9Z-HVL4].
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750, 755.
Id. at 750.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2018)).
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for denying the right to bail altogether.53 The Court found those procedures sufﬁcient to sustain the federal bail statute. It did not say whether those procedures
would be necessary for state or municipal systems to pass constitutional muster.
One federal court in Louisiana, following what we might call a strong reading of
Salerno, has ordered declaratory relief against the Orleans Parish Magistrate
Judge for denying defendants the procedural safeguards sustained in Salerno.54
The judge’s appeal of that decision is pending in the Fifth Circuit.
The other major question of Salerno’s reach beyond the federal statutory context is how courts should evaluate unaffordable bail. Salerno was denied release
on bail altogether—there was no money amount he could have paid to be released pretrial. What happens when the same kind of detention is accomplished
by an unobtainable bail—that is, where bail is theoretically payable, but the
amount is out of the defendant’s reach? Every circuit court to squarely address
the question has held that, when applying the Federal Bail Reform Act, an unaffordable bail is tantamount to a denial of bail altogether, and it requires the same
procedures the Act extends to those denied bail outright.55 Arguably, these holdings are only a straightforward matter of statutory construction, as the drafters
of the federal statute were quite clear that this was their intended result.56 The
question thus remains open whether outside the federal context, courts should
consider any unaffordable bail to be a de facto order of pretrial detention. The
district court in Harris County applied that standard, and other trial courts have
since followed.57
A strong reading of Salerno thus means that the substantive due process analysis of a money bail system ends up in much the same place as the equal protection analysis: The government must engage in sufficient process to carefully determine whether there is any other alternative to detention for failure to pay bail.
The only signiﬁcant difference is that equal protection analysis turns on classiﬁcations of wealth and, therefore, might require some determination of who falls
into an “indigence” classiﬁcation.58 Because substantive due process analysis

53.
54.
55.

56.
57.
58.

Id. at 750-52.
Caliste v. Cantrell, 329 F. Supp. 3d 296, 311-13 (E.D. La. 2018), appeal pending, Caliste v.
Cantrell, No. 18-30954 (5th Cir. Aug. 21, 2018).
E.g., United States v. Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v.
McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 108-10 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Clark, Crim. No. 12-156
(W.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2012).
See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 16 (1983).
ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 158 (5th Cir. 2018); Shultz v. Alabama, 330 F. Supp.
3d 1344, 1358 (N.D. Ala. 2018); Caliste, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 311-12.
Bearden’s majority opinion is quite clear that its rule applies only to “the indigent,” a word
used twenty times in the opinion but nowhere deﬁned. Bearden himself had no assets or income and was unable to pay off a $500 ﬁne. It is not clear that mere inability to pay a more
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turns on the fundamental nature of the right involved—pretrial liberty and its
related rights to prepare a defense and be presumed innocent pending trial59—
an unaffordable bail amount may trigger heightened procedures even if the defendant is relatively wealthy.
C. Procedural Due Process
The unartfully named “procedural due process” analysis follows a different
track from substantive due process. Instead of focusing on whether a right is
fundamental and therefore requires strict scrutiny protection, courts understand
the Due Process Clause to protect ordinary liberty and property interests by balancing the interests of the individual against those of the state. The leading case
of Mathews v. Eldridge requires courts to consider “three distinct factors”: (1) “the
private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including” its “ﬁscal and administrative” efficiency interests.60
The Supreme Court has not given precise direction on which procedures may
satisfy this test with respect to pretrial defendants. Moreover, in Turner v. Rogers,
the Court indicated that a lack of one procedural safeguard—such as the availability of counsel—could be made up for by the presence of others, such as notice,
the ability to present evidence, and the relative sophistication of the adversarial

sizeable bail amount—say, $150,000—would render a middle-class detainee “indigent” for
Bearden purposes. This would seem a bizarre result, but cases from the Bearden era treat “indigence” as a ﬁxed category (like the federal standard for poverty), rather than a relative
standard (like inability to pay). See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 607 (1974) (“[A] state
cannot arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents while leaving open avenues of appeal for
more affluent persons.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19 (1973)
(referring to “functional[] ‘indigen[ce]’” as “‘poor’ persons whose incomes fall below some
identiﬁable level of poverty”); Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
(“By deﬁnition an indigent is incapable of meeting any money bail requirement.”); Pugh v.
Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1194 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
(“[W]e are not called upon to decide whether any person is denied equal protection if he can
make bail in some amount, but is unable to post the amount of bail set. We are confronted
only with the question of the rights of indigents.”). In a footnote, the Bearden Court recognized that in the context of sentencing “indigency” can be “a relative term rather than a classiﬁcation,” but surmised for that reason that equal protection may not be the proper frame for
analyzing detention based on wealth status. 461 U.S. at 666 n.8. That suggestion is difficult
to reconcile with the narrow-tailoring approach the Court actually employed to decide the
case.
59. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
60. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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parties.61 The closest the Court has come to enunciating a list of pretrial process
protections was in Salerno, but as recounted above, the procedures reviewed in
Salerno were mandated by the federal bail statute itself; the Court did not consider whether any or all of the procedures were constitutionally required.
Thus, while a strong reading of Salerno could lead to strict scrutiny and demands that state and local governments apply the least restrictive alternative to
pretrial detention for inability to pay bail, a weak reading of Salerno has led the
Eleventh Circuit to conclude that local governments need only meet the Mathews
balancing test.62 On this weak reading of Salerno, the Supreme Court’s emphasis
on the Federal Act’s procedures was not a substantive due process tailoring analysis, but merely a procedural due process holding in the same mode of analysis
as Mathews. Nevertheless, some federal courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have
found common bail systems to fail even the Mathews test because they provide
insufficient notice, opportunity to present evidence and be heard, and judicial
consideration of evidence on the record.63 Considering the high costs of pretrial
incarceration and the signiﬁcant risk that incarceration imposes an unnecessary
deprivation of liberty, even the relatively slight burdens of the Mathews test may
pose a signiﬁcant challenge to typical bail systems.
What is not required under procedural due process is a substantive ﬁnding
that no alternative to detention is available to satisfy the state’s pretrial interests.
If only procedural due process is in view, a jurisdiction could in theory continue
to jail three-quarters of its pretrial population on the basis of wealth, so long as
timely hearings and nominal consideration of evidence is provided.64 For this
reason, civil rights litigants tend to emphasize equal protection or substantive
due process and their requirements of substantive scrutiny, while federal courts
leery of engaging in substantive review seem more willing to stop short at only
a procedural due process analysis.
Such courts, however, have been less than clear about the respective roles
equal protection, substantive due process, and procedural due process play in
their analysis. For example, in paring back the district court’s injunction in Harris County to a purely procedural order, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the injunction “makes some sense if one assumes a fundamental substantive due process right to be free from any form of wealth-based detention. But, as the
61.

564 U.S. 431, 444-46 (2011).
62. Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2018).
63. ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 158-59 (5th Cir. 2018).
64. See ODonnell v. Goodhart, 900 F.3d 220, 227, 228 (5th Cir. 2018) (reasoning, as a panel deciding a motion to stay the district court’s revised injunction following remand, that, under procedural due process, “a procedural violation is subject [only] to procedural relief” and that
“[d]etention of indigent arrestees and release of wealthier ones is not constitutionally inﬁrm
purely because” indigent defendants are detained longer than wealthier ones).
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foregoing analysis establishes, no such right is in view. The sweeping injunction
is overbroad.”65 Yet the district court had reasoned from equal protection, not
substantive due process.66 Most importantly, since the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s equal protection holding in the same opinion, a substantive rather
than purely procedural remedy was clearly appropriate.67
D. Excessive Bail
In all the recent challenges, the bell that largely hasn’t rung is the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on “excessive bail.” In the 1951 case Stack v. Boyle, the
Supreme Court’s ﬁrst major opinion interpreting that clause, the Court held that
“excessive” meant only that “bail [had been] set at a ﬁgure higher than an
amount reasonably calculated” to ensure the defendant’s presence at trial.68 As
noted above, the Court later added public safety as a legitimate state interest in
the setting of bail,69 but the effect remains the same: excessiveness is understood
in relation to the state’s goals, not in relation to what the defendant can afford
or the consequences of an amount set beyond the defendant’s means. Judges
enjoy broad discretion to determine what amount satisﬁes the state’s goals, and
following Stack, federal courts have routinely held that “bail is not excessive under the Eighth Amendment merely because it is unaffordable.”70

65.
66.

67.

68.
69.
70.

ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 163.
ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1147 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (“[T]he court’s conclusions do not rely on substantive due process.”); id. at 1147-53 (ﬁnding a likelihood of success on the merits of plaintiffs’ equal protection claim). Thus, the Fifth Circuit did not consider the requirements of substantive due process either. Instead, the Fifth Circuit analyzed
Harris County’s bail regime under procedural due process. Further still, in the procedural
analysis it only considered the state-created liberty interest generated by Texas state law on
pretrial release, not the “fundamental” constitutional right to liberty that Salerno could be read
to proclaim. Thus, substantive due process was left completely out of the Fifth Circuit’s “foregoing analysis.” See ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 157-61.
See ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 163; cf. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 220 (1990) (“[The]
substantive issue involves a deﬁnition of th[e] protected constitutional interest, as well as
identiﬁcation of the conditions under which competing state interests might outweigh it. The
procedural issue concerns the minimum procedures required by the Constitution for determining that the individual’s liberty interest actually is outweighed in a particular instance.”
(quotation omitted)). In a forthcoming paper, Brandon L. Garrett criticizes the Fifth Circuit’s
merely procedural remedy on the same ground. See Brandon L. Garrett, Wealth, Equal Protection, and Due Process, WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 21), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3313358.
342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987).
E.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2018).
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That does not mean that an Eighth Amendment challenge against common
municipal bail systems would be doomed to fail. Recent scholarship by Beth
Colgan on the Excessive Fines Clause convincingly demonstrates that the original public meaning of “excessive” directly related to the defendant’s means and
to the consequences that would follow if a defendant could not pay a ﬁne.71 Colgan’s historical work and arguments could inform the interpretation of the Excessive Bail Clause since, as the Court recently noted, the two clauses “place parallel limitations on the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function
of government.”72
***
To summarize, a line of Supreme Court cases about postconviction ﬁnes appears ready-made to challenge pretrial bail regimes on equal protection grounds.
Applying that line would forbid detaining the indigent when the wealthy could
go free unless the state could ﬁnd no other alternative to assure the presence of
the defendant at trial or to protect public safety. Meanwhile, the Supreme
Court’s due process review of the federal bail statute seems instructive—though
courts are currently divided as to what that instruction is. On a strong reading,
the Constitution protects the fundamental right of pretrial liberty unless the
state can, as required under equal protection, show that there is no alternative to
detention available to meet its interests. On a weak reading, the Constitution
protects pretrial liberty with certain (as yet undeﬁned) procedures, but if the
state offers those procedures, courts may not have to rigorously inquire into
whether alternatives to detention are available to meet the state’s interest. Under
Salerno, those procedures may include an adversary hearing, ﬁndings on the record by a clear-and-convincing standard, and a right of expeditious appeal.
71.
72.

Beth Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2014).
Timbs v. Indiana, No. 17-1091, slip op. at 3 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2019) (majority opinion) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Even if Stack remains the dominant interpretation of
“excessive” bail, the test for evaluating whether a bail amount is disproportionate to meeting
the state’s interests may well turn out to be functionally the same analysis as the due process
or equal protection inquiry. For instance, the Sixth Circuit, in Fields v. Henry County, 701 F.3d
180 (6th Cir. 2012), indicated that bail may be “excessive” if (1) the bail set is “grossly disproportional to the gravity” of a charged offense, id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Bajakajian,
524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998)); (2) the evidence produced at a bail hearing “was too weak to justify
the amount,” id. at 185 (citing United States v. Leisure, 710 F.2d 422, 428 (8th Cir. 1983)); or
(3) the bail “was much higher than normal for such charges or . . . the judge relied upon impermissible factors,” id. (citing Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 213 (1st Cir. 1987)). Taken
together, such factors tend to mimic a tailoring standard similar to heightened scrutiny, especially if a court were to inform its sense of proportionality based on recent empirical work on
the relative ineffectiveness of money bail at meeting the state interests at stake. See infra notes
81-89 and accompanying text. That is, the Eighth Amendment is not meaningless under
Stack; it just may not have much independent meaning beyond what the other clauses already
require, substantively and procedurally.
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To be sure, this survey does not exhaust potential theories for how the Federal Constitution may govern the municipal regulation of bail. The Supreme
Court has, for instance, applied due process and equal protection principles expansively in cases that Judith Resnik characterizes as involving “[a]symmetrical
power and high stakes,” such as when striking down ﬁling fees to access divorce
proceedings in Boddie v. Connecticut.73 Perhaps even more surprising than the
absence of the Eighth Amendment in recent bail challenges is the absence of racial discrimination claims, given the wildly disproportionate impact of mass pretrial detention on communities of color.74 This survey, however, focuses on the
arguments litigants are making in federal courts, which are necessarily more limited in imaginative range. So long as the Court disfavors racial discrimination
claims based on disparate impact without ironclad proof of intentional animus,75
litigators have steered their arguments towards the more favorable precedents
on discrimination based on wealth and class. The Supreme Court has largely
foreclosed the use of statistical evidence to establish racial discrimination,76
while statistics on wealth discrimination have managed to have more sway in
federal courts so far.77
Applying equal protection and due process standards in recent challenges to
state and municipal bail systems has raised two particularly thorny issues. How
those issues are ultimately resolved in the federal courts will dramatically affect
the trend of modern bail reform and will largely determine whether or not bail
reformers can continue to proceed in federal court challenges.

73.

74.

75.
76.

77.

401 U.S. 371 (1971); see Judith Resnik, Courts and Economic and Social Rights/Courts as Economic and Social Rights, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 259, 277 (Katharine
G. Young ed., forthcoming 2019).
See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ODonnell v. Harris County, Civil No. 16-1414
(S.D. Tex. 2017) (“African Americans make up 18% of Harris County’s adult population, but
account for 48% of the adult prison population in Harris County.”).
See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
See Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court Refused to Accept Statistical Evidence of Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp—and Some Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1269
(2018).
See infra Section II.A (discussing federal courts’ consideration of statistical evidence in the
Harris County case).
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ii. the central difficulty: a crisis of scrutiny
A. Federal Court Scrutiny
The ﬁrst puzzle is what level of scrutiny federal courts must use to review
challenges to state and local bail systems, since the standard is far from clear in
the case law. By this point, the general reader may be getting frustrated. Levels
of review have not been a fashionable academic topic for some time.78 After all,
what practical difference does any of this make? When do we actually start talking about the substantive justice of pretrial incarceration?
To answer, we must turn away from the cases for a moment and consider
both a truly astounding literature on pretrial bail and detention emerging in the
social sciences and impressively broad-based social movements to reform bail.
In the last half-decade, an unprecedented number of rigorously controlled, scientiﬁc analyses of pretrial bail systems have appeared in both social science journals and law reviews (in fact, the Yale Law Journal has published three articles on
the implications of this research for pretrial detention in recent years).79
Taken together, this literature helps to quantify just how devastating pretrial
detention is for defendants. Controlling for relevant factors, detained misdemeanor defendants in Harris County, for instance, are twenty-ﬁve percent more
likely to be convicted and forty-three percent more likely to be sentenced to jail
than their counterparts who were released pretrial.80 Detained defendants are
more likely to lose jobs, apartments, and child custody, and some studies have
suggested that pretrial detention is itself substantially criminogenic.81 Importantly, the research indicates that all of these adverse effects are triggered by
as little as two or three days of detention.82

78.

79.

80.
81.

82.

But see Emma Kauffman, Segregation by Citizenship, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1379 (2019) (documenting the rise of the all-foreign prison and arguing that federal penal segregation by citizenship
status should trigger strict scrutiny).
Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019); Sandra G. Mayson,
Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490 (2018); Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and
the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344 (2014).
Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN.
L. REV. 711, 741-59, 787 (2017).
Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 224-26 (2018); Heaton
et al., supra note 80, at 718; see also id. at 760 (considering possible causes of pretrial detention’s criminogenic effect).
CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF
PRETRIAL DETENTION 10-11 (2013).
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Moreover, recent work on the operation of incentives in the pretrial phase
indicates that these costs are not only devastating but unnecessary. Charitable
bail funds—which demand no cash from and therefore impose no ﬁnancial incentives on their bailees—have achieved promising appearance rates with little
more than low-cost text-message reminders and transportation subsidies.83
Other empirical work shows that risks of dangerousness and ﬂight can be successfully managed at signiﬁcantly lower cost than pretrial incarceration.84
Here, then, is the fundamental crisis of bail: If these studies make their way
into the factual record of a federal court applying a searching level of review, the
most common American bail systems, which casually impose detention for failure to put up secured money, are almost certain to fall. The common assumption
that secured money bail incentivizes appearance in some way that other public
assistance or sanctions could not completely collapses under their weight.85 Although municipalities have employed these systems for decades all across the
country, no federal court that has reached the merits under heightened scrutiny
has yet sustained these systems against challenges demanding extensive remediation by the trial courts.
Harris County is the model case here. In an extensive opinion—193 pages as
docketed—Judge Rosenthal reviewed not only the secondary literature discussed

83.

Jason Tashea, Text-Message Reminders Are a Cheap and Effective Way to Reduce Pretrial Detention,
A.B.A. J. (July 17, 2018, 7:10 AM CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article
/text_messages_can_keep_people_out_of_jail [https://perma.cc/A3FP-GY6B]; see also PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND PERFORMANCE
BUDGET REQUEST, FY 2019, at 27 (2018). As Jocelyn Simonson has argued, charitable bail
funds not only call into question the incentive argument, but also suggest reconceiving the
social costs weighed in a pretrial detention decision. Instead of assuming that the public’s
interest is secured only by pretrial detention, community bail funds show the public interest in
release and restoration of defendants to jobs and homes. Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nulliﬁcation,
115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 612-21 (2017); see also Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System,
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1417-29 (2017) (arguing that in a cost-beneﬁt analysis of pretrial detention, various community interests are a cost of pretrial detention).
84. Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 528-29 (2012);
Lauryn P. Gouldin, Deﬁning Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 729-35 (2018).
85. Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 476 (2016); Michael R. Jones, Unsecured Bonds: The As Effective and Most Efficient Pretrial Release Option, PRETRIAL J. INST. (Oct.
2013). See also the recently released study of Philadelphia’s reduction in cash-bail requirements since District Attorney Larry Krasner instituted an office policy against requesting bail
for a range of offenses. Aurelie Ouss & Megan T. Stevenson, Evaluating the Impacts of Eliminating Prosecutorial Requests for Cash Bail 1 (George Mason Legal Studies Research Paper No.
LS 19-08, Feb. 17, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3335138 (ﬁnding that the percentage of
defendants released on their own recognizance—rather than on monetary or other conditions—increased by twelve points following the policy while appearance rates remained stable).
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above, but also made-to-order studies conducted by expert sociologists and data
scientists retained by the parties. She concluded that “release on secured ﬁnancial
conditions does not assure better rates of appearance or of law-abiding conduct
before trial compared to release on unsecured bonds or nonﬁnancial conditions
of supervision.”86 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s factual ﬁndings,87 and other courts are now relying on those ﬁndings as they scrutinize other
municipal bail systems.88
Judge Rosenthal’s opinion also scrutinized the record of recent bail reform
occurring across the country, most of it in response to social and political movements marshalling constitutional arguments not in federal court cases but in local legislatures and other rulemaking bodies.89 The court considered, for instance, statutory changes prioritizing release and procedurally protected and
transparent detention orders over money bail in Washington, D.C., New Mexico, and New Jersey, as well as court administrative rules forbidding pretrial detention based solely on indigence in Maryland and New Orleans.90 If the decision were written today, it could have listed even more jurisdictions with recent
signiﬁcant political change, including Atlanta, Chicago, and California.91
Although it carefully stressed that “it is not a federal court’s role in any way
to make policy judgments,” the district court in Harris County noted that there
is a “clear and growing movement” toward questioning historical bail practices
on constitutional—and not just political—grounds.92 The court observed that reforming jurisdictions broadly divided into two camps93: those that anchored
their reforms in the constitutional logic of the American Bar Association’s Standards for Pretrial Release, which argues that bail “must be within the reach of the
defendant”94 and those that tracked the reasoning of the Obama-era Department

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

92.
93.
94.

ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1118 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 162-63 (5th Cir. 2018).
E.g., Shultz v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1367-68 (N.D. Ala. 2018); Daves v. Dallas County,
341 F. Supp. 3d 688, 696-97 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1078-84.
See id.
See S.B. 10, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); Atlanta, Ga., Ordinance 18-O-1045 (Feb. 5,
2018), http://citycouncil.atlantaga.gov/Home/ShowDocument?id=983 [https://perma.cc
/J9Y9-56QW]; Cook County, Ill., Gen. Order No. 18.8A(Ill. Cir. Ct. July 17, 2017), http://
www.cookcountycourt.org/Portals/0/Orders/General%20Order%20No.%2018.8a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NS8M-AKGP].
ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1084.
Id. at 1083-84.
Id. at 1083; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE, Standard 10-1.4 (AM.
BAR ASS’N, 3d ed. 2007).
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of Justice,95 which argued that unaffordable bail is permissible only when a court
ﬁnds that release on any other conditions would not reasonably assure the individual’s appearance. The constitutional pronouncements of the ABA, the Department of Justice, and state supreme courts and legislatures helped supply the
case law, so to speak, that never developed as Foote and other reformers expected
over the last ﬁve decades. The recognition in a federal court that social and political movements toward bail reform are relevant to constitutional analysis
opens up room for other judges (and advocates) to also draw on political change
in their constitutional analysis.96 It also makes it easier for courts to forge new
constitutional understandings in the face of decades of Supreme Court silence
on the issue. In short, social movements fuel the current crisis of bail as much as
the empirical studies.
Some courts appear reluctant to ﬁnd that such a widespread and longstanding system of practice could have been unconstitutional and in need of the kind
of strict federal court supervision required in, for instance, the desegregation
cases. But given the factual ﬁndings of the federal trial courts and the widely
accepted and broadly mobilized studies on which they rely, there is very little
ground on which to sustain common municipal bail systems on the merits—
unless the federal courts cannot develop these records in the ﬁrst place. This is
why, going forward, the standard of scrutiny will be critically important. The
Supreme Court declined the opportunity to take up the question this term.97
Whether or not it addresses these issues soon, it will have to do so in the years
ahead. A $2 billion commercial bail-bond industry and the federal supervision
of a thousand local regimes depend on it.

95.

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee and Urging Affirmance on the Issue Addressed Herein, Walker v. City of Calhoun, 682 Fed. Appx. 721 (11th
Cir. 2017), 2016 WL 4417421.
96. The story of recent social movements towards bail reform has yet to be told. For a partial list
of what organizers, lawyers, faith leaders, and academics have recently accomplished to dismantle pre- and post-trial incarceration, see Alec Karakatsanis, The Punishment Bureaucracy:
How to Think About “Criminal Justice Reform,” 128 YALE L.J.F. 848, 932-35 (2019). For various
articulations of how social and political mobilization can inform constitutional jurisprudence,
see Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case
of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (2005); Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Towards a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740
(2014); Martha Minow, Law and Social Change, 62 UMKC L. REV. 171 (1993); Reva B. Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conﬂict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
97. See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, Walker, No. 18-814
(U.S. Apr. 1, 2019).

1116

the present crisis in american bail

***
As noted above, the Eleventh Circuit has read Salerno as requiring only a
procedural due process balancing of state and individual interests and therefore
does not demand particularly rigorous procedural protections.98 On the other
hand, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, is adamant that Salerno requires strict
scrutiny of pretrial detention regimes.99 The Supreme Court itself has given
some indication that it views Salerno as among its strict-scrutiny cases,100 but it
has not deﬁnitively ruled so.
The Court has been even more circumspect about the equal protection analysis in Bearden. Although the parties in Bearden debated strict scrutiny in their
brieﬁng,101 the Bearden Court refused to declare a level of review, rejecting what
it called a “resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis.”102 The Court noted
that in its precedents on wealth-based detention, “[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge in the Court’s analysis,” and it largely left the matter
there.103 By focusing on wealth classiﬁcations and by demanding that the state
use the least restrictive alternative available to meet its interests, Bearden seems
to have functionally applied strict scrutiny while adamantly refusing to say so.
Accordingly, lower federal courts have come out all over on the question of
scrutiny. Some have applied “heightened” scrutiny while attempting to dodge
specifying how that differs from strict scrutiny.104 A district court in California,
and now the Eleventh Circuit, found that Bearden requires only rational basis

98.

99.

100.

101.
102.
103.
104.

Walker, 901 F.3d at 1262-65; see also Woods v. City of Michigan City, 940 F.2d 275, 283-86 (7th
Cir. 1991) (Will, J., concurring); Katona v. City of Cheyenne, 686 F. Supp. 289, 293 (D. Wyo.
1988).
Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 780-81 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). The highest courts
of Arizona and Massachusetts and a California Court of Appeals have taken the same view of
Salerno. See Simpson v. Miller, 387 P.3d 1270 (Ariz. 2017); Brangan v. Commonwealth, 80
N.E.3d 949 (Mass. 2017); In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513 (Ct. App. 2018).
In Foucha v. Louisiana, for instance, the Court held that the detention of defendants acquitted
on insanity grounds violated substantive due process on the basis that “unlike the sharply
focused scheme at issue in Salerno, the Louisiana scheme of conﬁnement is not carefully limited.” 504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); id. at 316
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
Brief for Petitioner at 24-32, Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (No. 81-6633); Brief for
Respondent at 22-29, Bearden, 461 U.S. 660 (No. 81-6633).
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666-67.
Id. at 665. For an argument that Bearden provides a sound intersectional theory of “equal process,” see Garrett, supra note 67.
See, e.g., Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 15-CV-04959-YGR, 2018 WL 424362,
at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2018).
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review of bail systems.105 The district court in Harris County applied “intermediate scrutiny,” which has the advantage of compromise, applying heightened
(but not the highest) scrutiny. Nevertheless, the choice is somewhat awkward
since intermediate scrutiny to this point has only applied to gender discrimination and certain free speech claims.106 In affirming the Harris County order, the
Fifth Circuit ruled only that the application of intermediate scrutiny “was not in
error,” given that the en banc Fifth Circuit had previously applied the Bearden
predecessor cases to pretrial detention.107 Thus, the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits
have divided over the question of scrutiny under Salerno, while the Fifth and
Eleventh have divided over the question of scrutiny under Bearden.108
There are a number of good reasons to conclude that strict, or at least heightened scrutiny, makes the best sense of the Supreme Court’s precedents. If heightened scrutiny, narrow tailoring, and a substantive ﬁnding of necessity protect
convicted indigent defendants, they surely ought to apply in the pretrial context,
where the presumption of innocence and a defendant’s ability to prepare for trial
are most vulnerable.109 If Congress’s bail statute was constitutional because it
“careful[ly] delineat[ed]” the circumstances in which detention was authorized,
and these were limited to cases involving “extremely serious offenses,”110 municipal systems that detain forty percent of misdemeanor defendants until the
termination of their proceedings—as Harris County did—should at a minimum
be subjected to heightened review.111
The trial court in Harris County hinted that there may be another good reason to read the Supreme Court’s precedents in favor of searching review of municipal bail systems in the federal courts. In its conclusion on Harris County’s
motion to dismiss, the court recalled the 1871 origins of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.112 Now
105.
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107.
108.

109.
110.
111.
112.

Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1262 (11th Cir. 2018); Welchen v. County of Sacramento, No. 2:16-cv-00185-TLN-KJN, 2016 WL 5930563, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2016). Notably, the Schultz court, bound by Walker, nevertheless found Cullman County’s bail system
failed rational basis review. Shultz v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1358, 1365 n.23 (N.D. Ala.
2018).
ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1138-39 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d as modiﬁed,
892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018); see Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 161-62.
The Buffin court in the Northern District of California has also squarely disagreed with the
Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Walker. See Buffin, 2019 WL 1017537, at *15 (“Ultimately, this
Court does not share the same view on the principle of liberty as the Walker court.”).
See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987).
See ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1105.
ODonnell v. Harris County, 227 F. Supp. 3d 706, 759 (S.D. Tex. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018).
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the main vehicle for litigating violations of constitutional rights by state actors,
§ 1983 arose from the Reconstruction Congress’s effort “to enforce provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a
State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their
authority or misuse it.”113 The federal district court applied this history by cutting through the myriad procedural and jurisdictional challenges raised by the
defendant county, reasoning that although
[m]ultiple and overlapping authorities may contribute to a policy of
denying freedom from pretrial detention to those accused in misdemeanor cases solely because they are too poor to pay a bail bond, . . . the
existence of multiple and overlapping authorities cannot, on its own,
shield officers or official bodies from liability.114
Indeed, the Reconstruction Era origins of modern civil rights law may likewise
counsel strict scrutiny and a substantive ﬁnding of necessity before defendants
can be jailed for inability to pay bail.
The need for federal oversight of state and municipal bail regimes was a critical spur—perhaps the critical spur—to the passage of the Reconstruction
Amendments, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871
(now more familiar to us as 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Legal historians often overlook
the role of bail in southern resistance to Reconstruction. A full account lies beyond the scope of this Essay, but a couple of examples can illustrate the key point.
The black codes’ infamous ban on African American ownership of ﬁrearms, for
instance, was enforced by holding violators “in default of bail,” or under preventive detention as we would now call it.115 The economic historian Jennifer
Roback notes that bail was crucial to the debt peonage system erected by the
southern black codes.116 Former masters would stand surety to freedmen incarcerated on manufactured criminal charges. Freedmen were then bound by the
black codes to work off their bail debt in service to their former masters.117 The
South’s postbellum attempt to reinstitute slavery, working hand in hand with its
reinscription of racial hierarchy, was thus primarily a function of bail law.
In countermanding the black codes and empowering federal courts to guard
against their reinstitution, the Reconstruction Congress was centrally concerned

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 28 (1991)).
ODonnell, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 759.
1866 Miss. Laws 165. On the expansion of this prohibition across the postbellum South, see
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 614-16 (2008).
Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive?, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1175-76 (1984).
Id.
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with federal scrutiny of state practices, both written and unwritten.118 These of
course included practices of bailing or detaining freedmen.119 Anthony Amsterdam argues that, properly understood in context, the major Reconstruction acts
were meant to grant freedmen broad rights of removal to federal court in order
to bring as-applied challenges to the unequal enforcement of state criminal law,
including discriminatory pretrial proceedings.120 From 1880 to the turn of the
century, the Supreme Court eroded the power of removal in state criminal proceedings.121 Nevertheless, the centrality of bail to the Reconstruction legacy, including our modern § 1983, ought to stand for something more than federal court
deference to any proposed rationality of unequal bail regimes that afford minimal process to defendants. One key way to uphold this legacy is to read the Supreme Court’s precedents in Bearden and Salerno straightforwardly to require
heightened federal court review of allegedly unequal and arbitrary municipal bail
regimes.
B. Probable Cause
A ﬁnal difficulty lies in ﬁguring out where probable cause properly ﬁts into
the system of pretrial arrest and bail, or more succinctly, what the Fourth
Amendment has to do with the Fourteenth. In Gerstein, the Supreme Court ruled
that the Fourth Amendment requires that a defendant arrested without a warrant appear before a neutral magistrate for a ﬁnding of probable cause
“promptly” after arrest.122 A later case deﬁned promptness as within forty-eight
118.
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The debates surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1866, for example, emphasize the need for
federal oversight over racially oppressive state policy. For the Senate debates, see CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (Jan. 29, 1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull); id. at 602
(Feb. 2, 1866) (statement of Sen. Lane); id. at 603 (statement of Sen. Wilson); id. at 605
(statement of Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1759 (April 4, 1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull). And
for the House debates, see id. at 1118 (March 1, 1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson); id. at 112324 (statement of Rep. Cook); id. at 1151 (March 2, 1866) (statement of Rep. Thayer); id. at
1160 (statement of Rep. Windom); id. at 1267 (March 8, 1866) (statement of Rep. Raymond);
see also id. at 340 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Sen. Wilson on the amendatory freedmen’s
bureau bill) (emphasizing the need for federal oversight).
For a vivid example of the way southern sheriffs could wield bail to coerce sale of freedmen’s
property, see the Radical Republican Albion Tourgée’s semi-autobiographical account of his
time as a state judge in Reconstruction North Carolina. ALBION TOURGÉE, BRICKS WITHOUT
STRAW: A NOVEL 261-65 (1880).
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction To Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793
(1965).
See, e.g., Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1906); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975).
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hours after arrest.123 The Gerstein Court ruled that these hearings did not require
representation by counsel under the slight procedural requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. In a separate passage, the Court encouraged states to experiment with how they fulﬁlled their various constitutional obligations before
trial, noting that states could choose to combine the probable-cause hearing with
other preliminary matters, such as the setting of bail.124 The difficult question is
whether the Supreme Court foreclosed the application of heightened scrutiny to
pretrial detention by substituting only Fourth Amendment protections instead.
Gerstein is open to two entirely different readings. Gerstein could be read to
say that only minimal process ﬂows from the Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable seizure, because other rights are protected by other requirements, including due process and equal protection. After all, the Court majority in response to the dissent considered the ﬁnding of probable cause “a threshold right”
and noted it was “in fact only the ﬁrst stage of an elaborate system, unique in
jurisprudence, designed to safeguard the rights of those accused of criminal conduct.”125 On this reading, a probable-cause determination may be combined
with bail setting or any other proceeding, but only if those proceedings continue
to satisfy the heighted requirements the Constitution places on them, not the
lower “threshold” standards of probable cause. For instance, a jurisdiction that
combined the ﬁnding of probable cause with an actual arraignment would surely
have to provide counsel, since the Court has long considered arraignment a “critical stage” of criminal proceedings.126
But there is another possible reading of Gerstein. Several times in its decision
the Court incautiously switched from speaking about probable cause for the arrest
to probable cause for the detention without considering whether different standards ought to apply in the days and weeks after an arrest. Even as it declared the
Fourth Amendment only a “threshold right,” the Court implied that this threshold right might govern the balance of interests between the state and the individual through the entire pretrial phase, “including the detention of suspects
pending trial.”127 Just two terms ago, the Court declared, citing Gerstein, that
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County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). Technically, McLaughlin established that administrative processing delays up to forty-eight hours are presumptively reasonable, not that they are entirely immune from challenge.
420 U.S. at 120-21, 123-24.
Id. at 125 n.27.
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 212-13 (2008); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,
629-30 n.3 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977).
420 U.S. at 125 n.27.
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“[t]he Fourth Amendment . . . establishes the standards and procedures governing pretrial detention.”128 In that case, Justice Kagan’s opinion for the Court expanded a right of action by a defendant arrested on false pretenses. It would be a
perverse result to read the statement as a retraction of pretrial due process down
to the minimal standards of the probable cause hearing, but that reading is at
least theoretically available.
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted just that reading. Viewing Salerno
and Bearden through the lens of Gerstein, rather than the other way around, the
Eleventh Circuit panel decided that, at least for the ﬁrst forty-eight hours after
arrest, pretrial detention regimes are subject only to rational basis review, and
that review is presumptively satisﬁed if the regime meets the minimal standards
of the Fourth Amendment.129 The panel ruled that the Equal Protection Clause
had no independent force in such a case, because detention within the ﬁrst fortyeight hours after arrest was not an “absolute deprivation” of liberty such that the
heightened standards of Rodriguez and Bearden would apply.130
The Eleventh Circuit’s reading of Gerstein may be plausible, but Gerstein’s
post-arrest procedures scarcely provide a proper assessment for a detention that
may last months or years. The Gerstein Court said little directly about duration,
yet it did seem to imagine that the standards it was announcing were to apply to
a relatively short period of post-arrest conﬁnement—or as the Court put it, “a
brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest.”131
And although it may seem intuitive that only limited due process can be provided
in the hours after arrest as the state conducts its initial investigation, a categorical
rule limiting due process during the ﬁrst forty-eight hours after all arrests is
overbroad.132 Salerno indicated that pretrial detention should be limited to “extremely serious offenses,” a substantive limitation that can be applied immediately upon arrest and determination of the charge.133 In fact, in practice, most
regimes identify the charge and release a defendant within minutes, hours, or at
most a day if the defendant can pay a prescheduled bail amount.134 The practical
128.
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Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 914 (2017).
Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1261.
420 U.S. at 113-14.
One root of the problem is the Court’s subsequent deﬁnition of forty-eight hours as
“prompt,” a serious misstep. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991).
This misstep is made all the more unfortunate by the fact it was rendered in 1991, right before
networked computing and digital telephony dramatically changed the technological
timeframe of administrating arrest.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
See Lindsay Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. 3
(2010), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx
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reality that many wealthy defendants are able to bail out so promptly suggests
that the state’s interest in administrative detention cannot be so high as to defeat
equal protection challenges, even those challenging brief or early periods of postarrest detention. After all, the adverse consequences of discriminatory pretrial
detention—including its criminogenic effects—begin to mount as soon as the
second day of detention.135
The Eleventh Circuit’s crabbed reading of Gerstein has been replicated by a
Fifth Circuit motions panel.136 Yet while some federal courts may be willing to
dodge the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment by looking only at the
Fourth, the Eleventh Circuit’s reading of Rodriguez is completely untenable. The
“absolute” quality of a liberty deprivation cannot turn on temporality. If it did,
only life imprisonment without parole would constitute an absolute deprivation
of liberty; yet that was clearly not what the Court had in mind in Rodriguez or in
its post-conviction ﬁne cases, all of which involved imprisonment of limited duration. Rather, as the Court has long held in its habeas jurisprudence, “absolute”
turns on the degree of conﬁnement, and incarceration in a jail is the absolute
height of depriving a person of bodily liberty.137 In sum, despite the Supreme
Court’s inattentive generalizations implying that only the Fourth Amendment
governs pretrial detention, federal courts must continue to apply the full range
of constitutional protections to their review of state and municipal detention regimes, as in fact the Court itself did in both Bearden (when evaluating a probationer’s arrest and detention under equal protection and due process) and Salerno (when evaluating a defendant’s pretrial detention under due process and
the Eighth Amendment).
conclusion
Where may the present crisis end? As the devastation of mass pretrial incarceration increasingly works its way into the public record, the federal courts ﬁnd
themselves at the head of a path that could lead to federal court supervision of
municipal regimes that is every bit as extensive and disruptive as the desegregation dockets after Brown v. Board of Education.138 Whether the courts will rise to
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?DocumentFileKey=b646a57f-6399-2fe4-5683-021480c3634a
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-JRZH] (noting that many jurisdictions, including Los Angeles County, use bail schedules to
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must await a hearing to determine their eligibility for nonmonetary or affordable conditions
of release).
Lowenkamp et al., supra note 83, at 10-11.
ODonnell v. Goodhart, 900 F.3d 220, 226-28 (5th Cir. 2018).
See Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1907 (2018).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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meet this crisis and carry out their role as guardians of equal protection and due
process against local oppression of the most politically powerless classes is perhaps doubtful.139 Already, appellate courts are ﬁnding ways to look past the
mounting evidence of rampant inequality and human rights violations in pretrial
incarceration in the name of “ﬂexibility and experimentation” and “deference to
the demands of federalism.”140
But the crisis touched off in Harris County may ﬁnd another template for its
resolution there. In the wake of the federal court injunction, a slate of political
challengers campaigned against the defendant judges on a platform of settling
the federal case and reforming the misdemeanor bail system. In November 2018,
the challengers won across the board.141 In January 2018, the new defendants
dropped all further appeals and reformed their system legislatively.142 Harris
County had paid elite national law ﬁrms over nine million dollars to defend the
bail suit.143 Ultimately that money bought the county nothing more than a slight
reprieve until election day.
A number of federal appellate courts will soon face the present crisis “‘twixt
old systems and the Word.”144 They must respond by enforcing clear constitutional boundaries on local discretion without reference to docket pressures or an
139.
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undue regard for federalism. If the Reconstruction-era landmark § 1983 doesn’t
give federal courts power to supervise and, if necessary, disrupt the jailing of
impoverished minorities based on mere accusations, one of the key purposes for
erecting the modern federal courts system will be thwarted.145 But if the federal
appellate courts disappoint, the fact that the lower courts have succeeded in
reaching the constitutional merits against America’s modern money bail system
has already blazed a trail toward building political power at the local level, even
in the most recalcitrant of municipalities.
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